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Abstract
This study examines the effect of political connections (PCONS) on firms’ 
disclosure of forward-looking information choices in the context of developing 
countries. Using multivariate regression of panel data comprising 360 firm-
year observations of non-financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia between 
years 2014 and 2017, PCONS are found to be positively associated with 
disclosure of forward-looking information. However, such relationship only 
exists for non-financial forward-looking information. Using the stakeholder 
salience theory to further contribute to the body of knowledge, the strength 
of the connections suggests that a high composition of politically-connected 
directors on the board promotes greater information about the future in 
firms’ disclosure. The common connection through ownership of firms in 
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emerging countries suggests the effective role of institutional shareholders in 
improving forecasting activities through high disclosure of forward-looking 
information. The study suggests a better appreciation of the hierarchical role 
of politically-connected directors on the board of types of forward-looking 
information presented to the stakeholders. 
Keywords: political connections, forward-looking information, information 
asymmetry, political power, voluntary disclosure.
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Introduction
Politicians have pervasive influence on businesses by assuming 
positions of CEOs, chairpersons of the board or board members to 
induce investments among firms around the world (Boubakri, Cosset, 
& Saffar, 2008; Rusli,  Mohd Saleh, Sabri Hassan, & Hafizuddin-Syah, 
2019). The dominant effects of the helping hand (positive effects) over 
the grabbing hand (negative effects), as suggested under the political 
hypothesis, have increased the firms’ demand for political connections 
(PCONS), especially in developing economies. Prior literature has 
shown that political connections affect firm performance, financial 
decisions (through debt and equity) and transparency, i.e., disclosure 
of information (for example, Ball, Robin, & Wu, 2003). However, not 
much is understood on the impact of the strength and types of political 
connections on a firm’s disclosure behaviour. As such, the objective 
of this study is to investigate the effect of the strength of political 
connections and its types on a very specific type of information 
disclosure, namely, forward-looking (financial and non-financial) 
information disclosure. In this study, we attempt to answer the 
question: Do the strength and types of political connections influence 
the level and types of forward-looking information disclosure? 
Forward-looking information disclosure refers to current plans and 
future forecasts that enable investors and other users to assess or 
predict a firm’s future financial performance (Aljifri & Hussainey, 
2007). The information disclosed is both financial and non-financial, 
including next year’s earnings, expected revenues, anticipated cash 
flows, risks and uncertainties. The discussion is about firms’ risks 
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and opportunities, strategic planning and future projects from the 
viewpoint of managers. This information is important for investors to 
make informed investment decisions. Forward-looking information 
disclosure may also improve the efficiency of the capital market 
(Bravo, 2016). However, the amount and quality of the information 
provided depends on the management and boards of the firms.
When politicians control a firm either through a representative on 
the board or the management or through the ownership of shares, 
beneficial forward-looking information is provided in exchange. 
Firstly, this argument is based on the nature of forward-looking 
politicians who are very much involved in policy making and 
foreseeing the future. Moreover, political directors have also been 
found to be prone to providing unique information about public 
policy, which is often very expensive or difficult for a firm to obtain 
(Hillman, Cannella, & Paetzold, 2000). Secondly, politicians who have 
information about the government’s long-term plans may align the 
firm’s plans with those of the government, thus providing disclosure 
to secure the firm’s future direction (Rusli et al., 2019). However, not 
much can be learnt from the literature about the link between political 
connections and firms’ forward-looking information disclosure.
We derive the argument of this study from the stakeholder salience 
theory, i.e., the higher the position of a political director/manager in 
the government, the more the influence (in terms of power, legitimacy 
or urgency) the director/manager has on the firm’s forward-looking 
information disclosure. This expectation is similar to that of Huang 
and Zhao (2016) and Du and Xiu (2009). We also examine the types of 
connections to determine the level of disclosure of forward-looking 
information. We believe that the capacity of a political position in 
the political system may cause variations in the firms’ disclosure 
behaviour.
This study makes several important contributions. Firstly, prior 
literature has mostly examined the effect of political connections on a 
firm’s performance (Huang & Xiao, 2012; Jaffar & Abdul-Shukor, 2016; 
Faccio, 2006); advantages for listing (Francis, Hasan, & Sun, 2009); 
corporate social responsibility (Huang & Zhao, 2016); and corporate 
voluntary disclosure (Hung, Kim, & Li, 2018). Although politicians 
are naturally visionary, the examination of political connections in 
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relation to forward-looking information disclosure is still lacking. 
Secondly, unlike most prior studies that have used dichotomy, i.e., 
existence versus non-existence of political influence, this study brings 
in the richness of the hierarchy within the governmental structure 
using the stakeholder salience theory. The argument has been used 
by Huang and Zhao (2016) in the context of Chinese corporate social 
responsibility. We use two proxies to determine the strength of 
political connections as suggested by Tsai, Zhang and  Zhao (2019) 
and Francis et al. (2009). We choose Malaysian firms that are known 
to be politically-connected or favoured as the sample of the study 
(Abdul Wahab & Abdul Rahman, 2009; Gomez & Jomo, 1999; Gul, 
2006; Johnson & Mitton, 2003). Hence, this study attempts to fill the 
gap on the impact of political connections on the level of information 
disclosure in the context of a developing country.
To achieve our objective and to answer the research question, we 
consider non-financial listed firms on the Main Board of Bursa 
Malaysia across industries for a four-year period from 2014 to 2017. 
We adopt a method suggested by Abed and Al-Najjar (2016) that uses 
text-unit analysis to gather forward-looking information from firms’ 
annual reports. The independent variable for each political connection 
is defined following prior literature (Bliss & Gul, 2012; Boubakri et al., 
2008; Fung, Gul and Radhakrishnan  (2015), 2015; Faccio, 2006; Rusli 
et al., 2019), and coded as dummy variables (CONNECT and TYPES), 
whereby strength is measured as a continuous variable. Our findings 
show that the disclosure level of forward-looking information is high 
among politically-connected firms. The positive association between 
political connection and such disclosure level is more significant among 
firms connected through ownership than directorship. However, the 
disclosure of forward-looking information is only significant for non-
financial forward-looking types. We suggest that government stakes 
through ownership is more efficient in influencing non-financial 
forward-looking information than individual politicians. Therefore, 
the study expects to provide practical implications in terms of 
understanding the effect of a political director’s hierarchy within the 
board or management on the types of forward-looking information 
disclosure presented to stakeholders. The benefits of high disclosure 
of forward-looking information also leans on the agency framework. 
The roles of political directors in reducing the agency cost of the firm 
through disclosure may result in high disclosure of forward-looking 
information.
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The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: literature 
review on forward-looking information disclosure and hypothesis 
development, research design and findings and conclusion.
Literature Review and Hypotheses Development
The literature on political economy has shown that political 
connections have a favourable impact on connected firms. The benefits 
enjoyed by such connected firms, both monetary and non-monetary, 
can be found worldwide. Under the monetary effects, connected firms 
have been found to enjoy lower interest rates on credit facilities and 
lower costs in financing. Likewise, non-monetary benefits arise from 
lucrative government projects (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; Goldman, 
Rocholl,  & So, 2009; Gomez & Jomo, 1999) and subsidies granted to 
connected firms. 
From a legal perspective, connected firms are found to have favourable 
regulatory treatment from the government (Agrawal & Knoeber, 2001; 
Firth, Rui, & Wu, 2011; Faccio, 2006). Referring to the political power 
hypothesis argued under the stakeholder salience theory, connected 
firms in China have been observed to enjoy high tax incentives due 
to the positive ties that help to decrease tax burden (Huang & Zhao 
2016). Researchers have further suggested that creating a relationship 
with politicians with power leads to certain advantages, particularly 
on tax preferences. A study conducted after the financial crisis in 
1997/98 has suggested that a high percentage of distressed firms in 
Malaysia were bailed out, especially those that were connected to the 
three most powerful politicians during that period (Gomez & Jomo, 
1999). However, the effects from the systematic exchange of favours 
between firms and the politicians, as directors, has promoted the 
opportunistic behaviour of political directors to deviate some of the 
firms’ resources for their political advantage. These adverse effects of 
political influence can be seen as the grabbing hand effect, which may 
be perceived as risky by stakeholders.
The paradoxical impact of political influence in business decisions 
have increased stakeholders’ demand for transparency through 
disclosure. This demand has pushed managers to increase their 
voluntary disclosure to help stakeholders’ decisions. The increased 
disclosure of information in the connected firms may not only bridge 
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the information gap between firms and stakeholders but may also 
signal the investment opportunities and benefits that arise due to 
the ties. The salient effects of political influence that are prevalent 
in corporate strategic planning have led us to study the role of such 
influence on disclosure. To develop the hypothesis, we use certain 
disclosure theories to explain the behaviour of disclosure practices 
among firms. The reasons for managers to voluntarily disclose 
additional information about the future are normally bound by 
signalling, proprietorship cost and litigation risk theories, as shown 
in Figure 1. 
Figure 1. Conceptual framework.
In most of the prior studies on disclosure, the limited disclosure 
among connected firms indicates high agency cost, which explains 
the ineffective role of the monitoring mechanisms (Boubakri, Ghoul, 
& Saffar, 2013; Guedhami & Pittman, 2006; Sepasi, Kazempour, 
& Mansourlakoraj, 2016; Shiri,  Salehi, & Radbon, 2016). The 
poor quality of disclosure exhibited by connected firms results in 
high earnings management (Yasser, Mamun, & Hook, 2017), and 
expropriation activities, i.e., misuse of power by politicians through 
improper channels of favours to their cronies in exchange for political 
support, bribes and nepotism (Bushman,  Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; 
Chaney,  Faccio, & Parsley, 2011; Mohammed, Ahmed, & Ji, 2017; 
Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). Hence, these practices may increase the risk of 
litigation. The benefits from such ties may provide fewer incentives 
for the connected firms to improve their disclosure quality (Chaney et 
al., 2011; Hung et al., 2018; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006).
However, some cases in developing countries have suggested that 
















In most of the prior studies on disclosure, the limited disclosure among connected firms indicates 
high agency cost, which explains the ineffective role of the monitoring mechanisms (Boubakri, 
Ghoul, & Saffar, 2013; Guedhami & Pittman, 2006; Sepasi, Kazempour, & Mansourlakoraj, 2016; 
Shiri,  Salehi, & Radbon, 2016). The poor quality of disclosure exhibited by connected firms 
results in high earnings management (Yasser, Mamun, & Hook, 2017), and expropriation 
activities, i.e., misuse of power by politicians through improper channels of favours to their cronies 
in exchange for political support, bribes and nepotism (Bushman,  Piotroski, & Smith, 2004; 
Chaney,  Faccio, & Parsley, 2011; Moham ed, Ahmed, & Ji, 2017; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). Hence, 
these p actices may incr a e the risk of litigation. The benefits from su  ties may p ovide fewer 
incentives for the connected firms t  improve their disclosure quality (Chaney et al., 2011; Hung 
et al., 2018; Leuz & Oberholzer-Gee, 2006). 
 
 However, some cases in developing countries have suggested that connected firms disclose more 
forward-looking information than non-connected firms. This claim is supported by Tsai et al. 
(2019), who document that connected firms disclose more forward-looking information. Access 
to confidential government information and its tangible and intangible resources (Kumlin & 
Rothstein, 2005)  provides politicians the advantage of supplying such information to the firms. 
Politicians on the boards of firms can reduce uncertainties about government policies and plans. 
Considering the nature of politicians who are very much involved in policy-making and foreseeing 
the future, the information provided by political directors may reduce the impact of uncertainties 
Figure 1. Theoretical framework. 
Politically - connected firms 









































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































    53 
IJMS 27(2), 47–76(2020) 
non-connected firms. This claim is supported by Tsai et al. (2019), 
who document that connected firms disclose more forward-looking 
information. Access to confidential government information and its 
tangible and intangible resources (Kumlin & Rothstein, 2005)  provides 
politicians the advantage of supplying such information to the firms. 
Politicians on the boards of firms can reduce uncertainties about 
government policies and plans. Considering the nature of politicians 
who are very much involved in policy-making and foreseeing the 
future, the information provided by political directors may reduce 
the impact of uncertainties in the future, thus mitigating the effects 
of information asymmetry. Moreover, the alignment of strategic 
plans of connected firms and government policies may increase the 
demand of such connections; moreover, the connection is treated as a 
way to reduce the agency cost (Rusli et al., 2019). Prior literature has 
supported the notion that political directors are prone to providing 
unique information about public policy, which is often very expensive 
or difficult for a firm to obtain (Hillman et al., 2000). Therefore, we 
believe that the level of forward-looking information disclosure by 
connected firms may vary more than that of non-connected firms due 
to the effects of the salient role of politicians as directors in the firms. 
Following the proprietorship cost theory, the disclosure of forward-
looking information may increase the competitive disadvantage 
of firms, thus increasing the firm’s proprietorship cost. However, 
given the gains of the ties, the high disclosure of government 
contracts by connected firms may not dispossess their competitive 
advantage as they are protected by the government (Hung et al., 
2018). In such circumstances, the connected firms not only enjoy 
lower proprietorship cost but also have low litigation risk due to 
the shield. As such, this study sheds some light on the conflicting 
results exhibited in prior literature. The benefits of high disclosure of 
forward-looking information also provide slim chances for tunnelling 
activities among politically-connected firms (Liu & Sun, 2010). It is 
also useful as a protective mechanism for minority shareholders, 
particularly in countries with weak protection of minority interests 
(Lakhal, 2015).
Hence, we predict that:
H1: Political connections is positively related to forward-looking 
information.
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To examine the strength of political connections on a firm’s disclosure 
level further, we use the stakeholder salience theory as a foundation 
to predict the relationship. The theory is defined as follows:
Stakeholder Salience Theory
The concept of salience is used to analyse the effects of managerial 
evaluation of stakeholders’ priority levels when they deal with 
conflicting stakeholders’ needs (Huang et al., 2016). Particularly, 
the comprehensive judgement of managers’ evaluation on the 
stakeholders’ importance level has created a ranking of stakeholders 
from the managers’ perspective (Mitchell et al., 1997). As proposed 
by Mitchell, Agle, & Wood, (1997), the combination of stakeholders’ 
legitimacy, urgency and power, determines salience. Mitchell 
et al. (1997) further define power as the ability and method of a 
stakeholder to affect the company’s decision. Moreover, legitimacy is 
a stakeholder’s obligation given by law, regulations and social duty, 
while urgency is the stakeholder’s requirement or demand that can be 
solved by managers. 
We consistently agree with Tsai et al. (2019) that the resources 
brought in by political connections may vary with the strength of 
those connections. Following Huang et al. (2016), the political power 
and the foundation of alliances can influence the stakeholders’ 
relative importance. From the political perspective, the hierarchy of 
politicians in the political system indicates a range of political power 
in accessing government resources and in channelling the allocation of 
resources to the firms. In other words, higher political positions may 
provide more information as they have access to the government’s 
classified information about the future, which may be beneficial to 
the firm’s strategic plans. Given that the government has control of 
almost all crucial resources, we believe that the hierarchical position 
of politicians in the political system may impact the disclosure 
information of forward-looking information. Besides the strength, we 
also examine the composition of political connections that influence 
the firm’s disclosure choices. 
Hence, we predict that:
H2:  The strength of political connection is positively associated with 
the disclosure of forward-looking information.
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Methodology
Data Sample and Variable Description
The sample includes all publicly listed firms on Bursa Malaysia 
between 2014 and 2017, except those in the financial industry. The 
exclusion of this industry from the sample is due to different reporting 
regulations and the industry’s unique characteristics (Embong, 
Mohd-Saleh, & Sabri Hassan, 2012; Jaffar & Abdul-Shukor, 2016; 
Rajan & Zingales, 1998). We choose the firms listed on the Main Board 
because they are large and endowed with resources, which will give 
more variation in the disclosure level (Embong et al., 2012; Lang & 
Lundholm, 1996). In relation to data collection, we use firms’ annual 
reports to gather forward-looking information. Hence, firms with no 
annual reports are dropped from the sample. We use these reports as 
a source of information because it is a primary channel to distribute 
information, particularly forward-looking information. Directors 
may use this platform for future planning or signalling any potential 
gains or threats that are useful for investors when making investment 
decisions. Besides, the publication of these annual reports is claimed 
to be not subject to potential re-interpretation and distortion by the 
media (Kent & Ung, 2003). We extract financial data from the Thomson 
Reuters Datastream. Only firms with complete financial data of four 
consecutive years are considered to be part of the sample. Therefore, 
the final sample of our study is 90 firms or equivalent to 360 firm-year 
observations. In Table 1, we provide a brief summary of sampling 
criteria that led to the final sample.
Table 1
Sampling Criteria Description
Criteria of sample No. of obs.
No. of non-financial observations (2014 and 2017) 1.072
No. of observations without annual report (222)
No. of observations with missing values (336)
No. of observations with no consecutive data (154)
No. of final observations in the sample (firm-year) 360
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As for independent variables, we determine political connections 
using a dummy variable of 1 if the firms are politically-connected 
through either directorship or ownership, and 0, if not connected. We 
define political connections in two different channels following Faccio 
(2006) and Boubakri et al. (2012), with a few modifications according 
to Malaysian practices. As suggested by Boubakri et al. (2012), Faccio 
(2006) classifies politically connected firms into two main categories 
of directorship or ownership. On the one hand, connection through 
directorship is identified if anyone among a firm’s top officers, 
namely, the Chief Executive Officers (CEO), chairperson of the board, 
president, vice-president or secretary, is a member of the parliament, 
a minister or a head of state. However, we also include closely related 
firms, defined as firms that have directors who have been previously 
appointed in one of the government linked companies (GLCs). On 
the other hand, firms owned by the government (with at least 10% 
of voting rights), or so-called GLCs, are identified as politically-
connected. This classification identifies that 67 firms are politically-
connected. 
Table 2
Weights of Different Bureaucracy Levels
 Tsai et al. (2019)





Township level and below 1
 Author’s mapping
Minister 4
Member of Parliament 3
Chief Minister & State 
Assemblymen 2
Closely related 1
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We use two proxies for strength of political connections, following 
Tsai et al. (2018), a weighted index, and Francis et al. (2009), using the 
composition of a political director on the board. The weighted index 
proposed by Tsai et al. (2019) is based on the network centrality of the 
politician. The higher the position of the politician is in the political 
system (towards the central government), the higher the weighted 
index will be. We map the weighted index according to the Malaysian 
political environment as follows:
Next, we develop a strength index of different bureaucratic levels 
(BUREAULVL) by summing up the weights for each observation. 
As for the dependent variable, we adopt a text-unit analysis from 
Abed et al. (2016) using a list of keywords and topics/themes under 
the forward-looking perspective to measure the level of forward-
looking information disclosure.1 Then, focusing on both financial 
and non-financial forward-looking information, we further expand 
the non-financial information into three different themes, i.e., 
environment, strategy and structure information. We measure the 
level of disclosure of forward-looking information by capturing the 
intersections of the keywords of forward-looking information and the 
keywords of themes as provided in Appendix A. The computerised 
method using the NVIVO software for identifying and measuring the 
level of forward-looking information disclosure of the firms listed in 
Malaysia helps increase the reliability and consistency of the findings 
(Morris, 1994). 
In this study, we also control for the factors that affect the level of 
forward-looking information disclosure to obtain appropriate 
inferences. The factors considered as control variables are cross-
firm differences in leverage (Al-Najjar & Abed, 2014; Alkhatib, 
2014; O’Sullivan, Percy, & Stewart, 2008; Wang & Hussainey, 2013); 
firm size (Hussainey  & Al-Najjar, 2011; Wang & Hussainey, 2013; 
Althanasakou & Hussainey, 2014); board size (Al-Najjar & Abed, 
2014; Elgammal,  Hussainey, & Ahmed,  2018); firm age (Aljifri,  , 
Hussainey, & Oyelere, 2013; Qu,  Ee, Liu, Wise, & Carey, 2015; Uyar 
& Kilic, 2012); growth (Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Athanasakou & 
Hussainey, 2014); profitability (Hussainey & Al-Najjar, 2011; Wang & 
Hussainey, 2013; Athanasakou & Hussainey, 2014); choice of auditor 
(Alkhatib 2014b; Lan,  Wang, & Zhang, 2013); and the number of 
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independent directors on the board (Gisbert & Navallas, 2013; Liu, 
2015). We also control for the effects of years and industry types 
that can influence the firm’s disclosure level. The Table on variable 
measurements is presented in Appendix 2. The models are as follows:
Regression Models
Model 1:
where subscript i refers to firm, t refers to time, and:
FWDLOOK is forward-looking information measured by a natural log 
of firm’s total number of text units of forward-looking information 
(both financial (FINFL) and non-financial forward-looking 
(NONFINFL) information types) at the end of the year.  
CONNECT is political connection - a firm is considered politically-
connected using the weighted index (BUREAULVL) by Tsai et al. 
(2018), and the composition of political directors on the board 
(PCONDIR) following Francis et al. (2009).
INDPDIR is board independence, measured as a natural log of 
the proportion of independent directors to total number of board 
members BIG4 is quality audit, defined as a dummy variable that is 
equal to 1 if the firm is audited by one of the big 4 audit firms (PWC, 
EY, DKC and KPMG), and 0, otherwise.
SIZE is firm size, measured by a natural log of firm’s total assets.
LEV is leverage, i.e., total debt to total assets ratio.
BTM is measured for growth and computed as a natural log of book 
value to the market value of equity.
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𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 =  𝛽𝛽0 +  𝛽𝛽1(𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽2(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽3(𝐵𝐵𝐼𝐼𝐵𝐵4)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽4(𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+  𝛽𝛽5(𝐹𝐹𝐶𝐶𝐿𝐿)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽6(𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝐵𝐵)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽7(𝐴𝐴𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽8(𝐼𝐼𝐹𝐹𝐴𝐴)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝛽𝛽9(𝐵𝐵𝐹𝐹𝐹𝐹𝑆𝑆𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
+  ∑ β
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐹𝐹𝐼𝐼𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 + ∑ β
𝑛𝑛
𝑖𝑖=1
(𝐼𝐼𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐼𝐼)𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +  𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖          (1) 
where subscript i refers to firm, t refers to time, and: 
(1)
    59 
IJMS 27(2), 47–76(2020) 
ROA is firm performance, measured by a firm’s return on assets (net 
profit over total assets).
BODSIZE is board size, defined as a natural log of total number of 
directors on the board.
INDUSTRY refers to dummy variables controlling for industry effects 
(across eight industries).
YEAR are year dummy variables ε is an error term
Model 1 exhibits an estimation of the main predictor, political 
connection (CONNECT), to estimate the level of forward-looking 
information disclosure (FWDLOOK). To test for the political influence 
on the level of the disclosure, we regress CONNECT on FWDLOOK 
and its types, i.e., financial forward-looking information (FINFL) and 
non-financial forward-looking information (NONFINFL) as shown in 
Models 1, 4 and 5 (Table 6) 2. To estimate the strength of the connection 
on FWDLOOK further, the index of strength (BUREAULVL) by Tsai et 
al. (2019) and the composition of politically connected firms’ director 
(PCONDIR) following Francis et al. (2009), are used to replace 
(CONNECT)it as shown in Model 2. The strength using both proxies 
is also estimated to predict the level of types of forward-looking 
information (FINFL and NONFINFL) as shown in Models 6 and 7.
Given that the political connection can be formed through directorship 
(DIRSHIP) and ownership (OWNSHIP), CONNECT is divided into 
DIRSHIP and OWNSHIP and regressed on the FWDLOOK and its 
types (FINFL and NONFINFL) as shown in Models 3, 8 and 9 in Table 
6. We believe the types of the connection may give a variation on the 
level of disclosure as argued by Huang et al. (2016) and Tsai et al. 
(2019).
Discussion of Findings
As for the dependent variable, the natural log of the number of text-
units is used to measure the level of disclosure of forward-looking 
information (FWDLOOK). 
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Table 3




FWDLOOK 3.40 3.38 0.73 2.08 4.65
FINFL 2.08 2.08 0.70 0.69 3.30
NONFINFL 3.04 3.05 0.89 0.00 5.05
CONNECT 0.73 1.00 0.45 0.00 1.00
BUREAULVL 0.15 0.10 0.17 0.00 1.00
PCONDIR 0.23 0.20 0.22 0.00 0.89
BODSIZE 2.16 2.20 0.24 1.61 2.71
SIZE 2.70 2.69 0.10 2.53 2.87
LEV 0.35 0.31 0.18 0.13 0.77
BTM 4.20 4.19 0.64 3.10 5.45
AGE 2.55 2.89 0.84 0.69 3.43
BIG4 0.92 1.00 0.27 0.00 1.00
ROA 1.71 1.77 0.87 -4.61 3.54
INDPDIR 0.45 0.43 0.12 0.25 0.78
Note: FWDLOOK is forward-looking information; FINFL is financial 
forward-looking information; NONFINFL is non-financial forward-looking 
information; CONNECT is political connection;  BUREAULVL is defined as 
index of political strength following Tsai et al. (2019); PCONDIR is defined 
as the composition of board of directors following Francis et al. (2009); 
INDPDIR is board independence; BIG4 is quality audit; SIZE is firm size; LEV 
is leverage; BTM is firm growth; AGE is firm age; ROA is firm performance; 
and BODSIZE is board size. All variables are as defined in Equation (1).
Table 3 shows the mean of log-transformed text units of 3.40 or 
equivalent to 38.97 text-units with a maximum value of 4.65 or 105 
text-units and a minimum value of 2.08 or eight text-units. Of the mean 
values, a value of 3.04 or equivalent to 29.99 text-units is reported to 
be non-financial forward-looking information (NONFINFL), whereas 
financial forward-looking information (FINFL) is reported at 2.08 or 
10.54 text-units. The initial statistics show that firms tend to disclose 
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more NONFINFL than FINFL. The findings are initially supported 
by Liu (2015) and Orens,  Aerts and Lybaert (2013) as they find that 
the soft qualitative types of disclosure or NONFINFL information is 
highly reported by firms in China and European countries. Hence, this 
evidence supports the argument suggested by Uyar and Kilic (2012) 
and Kent and Ung (2003), that firms disclose more qualitative future 
information. Inversely, the low level of FINFL information disclosure 
suggests high potential of litigation risk, thus curbing managers’ 




Difference between Types of Connections
 Mean  
DIRSHIP OWNSHIP BOTH F-stats
N 118 10 140  
FWDLOOK 3.20 3.69 3.79 27.65*
FINFL 1.89 2.49 2.39 17.55*
NONFINFL 2.84 3.31 3.49 25.12*
BODSIZE 2.15 2.00 2.24 16.52*
SIZE 2.69 2.63 2.75 29.61*
LEV 0.35 0.31 0.38 1.13
BTM 4.34 4.02 4.21 1.63
AGE 2.49 2.14 2.48 2.13
BIG4 0.90 0.90 0.98 3.74
ROA 1.71 1.85 1.61 3.33
INDPDIR 0.45 0.47 0.49 7.64*
Note: FWDLOOK is forward-looking information; FINFL is financial 
forward-looking information; NONFINFL is non-financial forward-
looking information; CONNECT is political connection; INDPDIR is board 
independence; BIG4 is quality audit; SIZE is firm size; LEV is leverage; BTM 
is firm growth; AGE is firm age; ROA is firm performance; and BODSIZE 
is board size. All variables are as defined in Equation (1). DIRSHIP is a 
firm that is politically-connected through directorship; OWNSHIP is a firm 
that is politically-connected through equity holding; BOTH is a firm that is 
politically-connected through both DIRSHIP and OWNSHIP. *p<0.01.
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Table 4 shows the ANOVA statistics to examine the differences in 
mean values among the types of connection used in the regressions. 
From the Table, the mean values of FWDLOOK level between the 
types of connection, namely, DIRSHIP, OWNSHIP and BOTH, are 
statistically different at the 1% level of significance. The disclosure 
level of FWDLOOK and its types (FINFL and NONFINFL) also show 
significant difference at the 1% level among the types of connection. 
This evidence shows that a separate analysis of disclosure behaviour 
based on the types of connection is warranted. Table 5 exhibits the 
correlation matrix with an initial relationship among variables, 
and the coefficient value is useful for signalling multicollinearity 
problems. The results show that FWDLOOK and CONNECT are 
positively correlated (p= 0.27), suggesting that PCONS promotes 
the FWDLOOK. However, the strength of PCONS is only positively 
significant (at conventional level) for Francis et al.’s (2009) approach, 
which uses the composition of the political directors on the board. 
Referring to the types of disclosure, the connected firms (CONNECT) 
promote more NONFINFL (p= 0.28) than FINFL (p= -0.30) types. 
However, further analysis must be conducted to validate the initial 
findings. The highest coefficient from the correlation is at 0.51 
(exclusion for types of connection and types of forward-looking 
information) and is lower than the threshold at 0.8, suggesting that 
multicollinearity is not a serious concern in our regression (Hair, 
Black, Babin, Anderson, 2011).
    63 
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political strength following Tsai et al. (2019); PCONDIR is defined as 
the composition of board of directors following Francis et al. (2009); 
DIRSHIP is a firm that is politically-connected through directorship; 
OWNSHIP is a firm that is politically-connected through equity 
holding; BODSIZE is board size; SIZE is firm size; LEV is leverage; 
BTM is firm growth; AGE is firm age; BIG4 is quality audit; ROA is 
firm performance; and INDPDIR is board independence. All variables 
are as defined in Equation (1).*p<0.01.
Regressions Results
To test the research model, this study uses multiple regression 
analysis for panel data between 2014 to 2017 across industries. Several 
assumptions are tested to ensure that the data fulfils the normality 
and homoscedasticity assumptions. Table 6 reports panel-random 
effects of the OLS estimation using the robust White covariance 
method to remedy the heterocedasticity problems in the regression of 
FWDLOOK, FINFL and NONFINFL by political connection, strength 
and types of connection. 
Referring to Model 1 in Table 6, we find that CONNECT is positively 
and significantly related to FWDLOOK at the 1% level. This result 
suggests that the disclosure level of forward-looking information 
is higher for connected firms. Specifically, the estimated coefficient 
of CONNECT posits that PCONS disclose FWDLOOK 21 points 
higher than non-PCONS. This finding is consistent with the results 
found by Liu (2015), Huang and Zhao (2016) and Du et al. (2009). 
However, the positive effects of CONNECT to promote FWDLOOK 
are only significant for NONFINFL types (see Model 5). The high 
disclosure of NONFINFL by the connected firms is consistently 
supported by Kent and Ung (2003), showing that Australian PCONS 
disclose more qualitative forward-looking information as it helps 
investors in investment decisions. Also, in China, the government 
encourages listed firms on the Shanghai Stock Exchange to disclose 
mainly NONFINFL about their future prospects and development, 
as one of the efforts to obtain financing facilities (Cheng, Youchao, 
& Jianmei, 2012). Moreover, litigation risk provides fewer incentives 
to managers to disclose FINFL, particularly when the target is not 
achievable and such disclosure can mislead the investors’ decisions 
and bring unfavourable outcomes to the investors  (Al-Najjar & 
Abed, 2014; Aljifri & Hussainey, 2007; Bravo, 2016; Tan,  Xu, Liu,  & 
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Zeng, 2015; Wang & Hussainey, 2013). In sum, the findings partially 
support Hypothesis 2 (H2), which posits that PCONS disclose more 
NONFINFL than non-PCONS. 
Furthermore, the result suggests the efficient role of political directors 
in providing additional disclosure of forward-looking information in 
their capacity as politicians. The high disclosure of NONFINFL also 
signifies that the connected firms may have more prospects than 
non-connected firms in investment opportunities due to their link 
to the government. Considering the nature of politicians who are 
involved in policy-making and foreseeing the future, connections 
with the government help firms to improve their  forward-looking 
disclosure level. This support can reduce the agency cost as political 
directors have been reported as having conflicting objectives between 
commercial enterprises and national interests (Wang, Wong, & Xia., 
2008). Hence, Hypothesis 1 (H1) is supported.
Table 6
Regression Estimations for all Models
                                                            Model
1  2 3











BODSIZE -0.29** -0.26 -0.26**
(-2.21) (-1.01) (-2.15)
SIZE 2.83*** 3.10*** 2.66***
(6.54) (6.11) (6.98)
(continued)
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                                                            Model
1  2 3
FWDLOOK   FWDLOOK FWDLOOK
BTM -0.07*** -0.04** -0.05**
(-5.65) (-2.39) (-2.33)
AGE -0.05 -0.04 -0.05
(-0.95) (-0.68) (-1.09)
BIG4 0.28*** 0.28*** 0.24***
(2.81) (3.18) (3.11)
ROA -0.07*** -0.00 -0.07***
(-4.33) (-0.61) (-5.33)
INDPDIR -0.03 -0.01 -0.03
(-0.30) (-0.02) (-0.38)
Constant -3.48** -4.16*** -2.96**
(-2.39) (-3.16) (-2.30)
Industry effect Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.20 0.18 0.22
F-stats 4.90 5.18 5.18
Table 6
Regression Estimations for all Models (cont')
                                                                                                                              
 Model
4 5 6 7 8 9
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 Model
4 5 6 7 8 9





BODSIZE -0.44** -0.17 -0.43** -0.16 -0.44* -0.14
(-1.97) (-1.04) (-2.22) (-0.97) (-1.68) (-0.49)
SIZE 2.93*** 3.02*** 3.05*** 3.27*** 2.73*** 2.72***
(6.05) (4.55) (5.22) (5.44) (5.56) (4.20)
LEV -0.17 -0.15 -0.17 -0.15 -0.09 -0.08
(-0.77) (-1.15) (-0.76) (-1.25) (-0.48) (-0.74)
BTM -0.06 -0.01 -0.06 -0.02 -0.01 0.03*
(-1.13) (-0.55) (-1.12) (-0.69) (-0.26) (1.67)
AGE 0.04 -0.06 0.03 -0.09 0.06 -0.06
(0.73) (-1.03) (0.64) (-1.37) (1.26) (-0.91)
BIG4 0.25* 0.23* 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.13
(1.90) (1.94) (1.47) (1.63) (1.49) (1.62)
ROA -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.09*** -0.08*** -0.01 0.00
(-3.52) (-8.53) (-4.40) (-4.43) (-1.45) (-0.04)
INDPDIR 0.08 0.22* 0.01 0.03 0.12 -0.02
(0.21) (1.75) (0.02) (0.20) (0.35) (-0.06)
Constant -4.49*** -4.96** -5.13*** -5.21*** -4.33*** -4.12**
(-5.57) (-2.20) (-4.80) (-2.99) (-6.56) (-2.28)
Industry 
effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year effect Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adj. R2 0.15 0.17 0.15 0.17 0.17 0.18
F-stats 3.69 4.18 4.21 4.58 4.71 4.81
N 316 316 324 324 316 316
Note: FWDLOOK is forward-looking information; FINFL is financial forward-looking 
information; NONFINFL is non-financial forward-looking information; CONNECT is 
political connection; BUREAULVL is defined as index of political strength following 
Tsai et al. (2019); PCONDIR is defined as the composition of board of directors 
following Francis et al. (2009); DIRSHIP is a firm that is politically-connected through 
directorship; OWNSHIP is a firm that is politically-connected through equity holding; 
BODSIZE is board size; SIZE is firm size; LEV is leverage; BTM is firm growth; AGE 
is firm age; BIG4 is quality audit; ROA is firm performance; and INDPDIR is board 
independence. All variables are as defined in Equation (1). Figures in parentheses are 
t-statistics.***p<0.01,**p<0.05 or *p<0.10.. 
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Looking at the strength of the political connection indicators shown in 
Model 2, the weighted index suggested by Tsai et al. (2019) indicates 
an insignificant effect of BUREAULVL (p=-0.16, t = -0.90)  (p = -0.16, 
t = -0.90) on forward-looking information disclosure. However, the 
high composition of PCONDIR in the board structure has a positive 
value (p=0.47, t=6.30) and is significantly related to FWDLOOK at the 
1% level. This finding suggests that the high composition of PCONS 
directors on the board explains their great capacity to effectively 
perform their duty as information providers. Instead of the power 
of network centrality, the high number of politicians on the board is 
more meaningful to help firms to improve their transparency level. 
The results also show that the selection of a proxy to measure political 
strength is important to infer the findings. Therefore, the stakeholder 
salience theory, which predicts the power, urgency and legitimacy 
of high political leaders to supply information about the future, is 
supported using the Francis et al. (2009) approach. 
In additional analyses, we determine the types of connection on 
forward-looking disclosure. From Model 3, the positive coefficient 
value of OWNSHIP, 0.42 (t=7.78) at the1% significance level, fulfils 
our expectation that firms connected through OWNSHIP may have 
greater FWDLOOK disclosure than DIRSHIP due to the collective 
capacity of politicians as directors of firms. This result is consistently 
aligned with our earlier findings using the Francis et al. (2009) 
approach. As we further analyse the sample according to the types of 
disclosure (Models 8 and 9), firms connected through OWNSHIP show 
a consistent association to NONFINFL at a conventional significance 
level (p = 0.49, t = 6.52, Model 9). The difference of a 49.3-point basis, 
which is higher for firms connected through OWNSHIP, suggests 
that high composition of stakes in the firm allows the government 
to provide additional forward-looking information to help investors 
accurately predict the future. 
Following the literature on disclosure, the presence of politicians in 
most GLCs in Malaysia has improved the disclosure quality used 
as a mechanism to bridge the information gap between firms and 
investors (Wang & Hussainey, 2013). The argument supporting high 
disclosure among GLCs is also documented by Eng and Mak (2003), 
as it reflects the promotion of a comprehensive development for 
social interest. The advantages to enhance the disclosure of forward-
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looking information are more critical when a firm has a large number 
of institutional shareholders. The dissemination of information 
through narratives in the disclosure is more cost-effective than the 
direct meetings with them (Wang & Hussainey, 2013).
Control variables, namely, big firm SIZE, high growth firms (BTM) 
and audited by BIG4, are found to be capable of disclosing quality 
information voluntarily as they have sufficient resources to bridge the 
information asymmetry gap, which can reduce the agency cost (Abed 
& Al-Najjar, 2016; Akhtaruddin,  Hossain, Hossain, & Yao, 2009; 
Dhaliwal,  Li, Tsang, & Yang, 2011; Lang & Lundholm, 1996; O’Sullivan 
et al., 2008). As for the ROA, high profitability firms are less likely 
to disclose additional forward-looking information; this observation 
is consistently supported by previous scholars (Hussainey & Al-
Najjar, 2011). Researchers have further suggested that the benefits of 
disclosing forward-looking information by low-performing firms will 
create additional benefits in the future (Alkhatib, 2014; Hussainey & 
Al-Najjar, 2011). 
From the overall results, the adjusted R2 of the regression analyses 
throughout the models range between 14 percent and 22 percent, 
which is comparable to Hung et al. (2018) in the international setting. 
Therefore, the influence of political connections in determining firms’ 





This study examines the effect of political connections on firms’ 
forward-looking information disclosure within the context of 
developing countries. Using 360 firm-year observations of non-
financial firms listed on Bursa Malaysia between 2014 and 2017, 
the political forces may considerably impact the disclosure level of 
forward-looking information. Using the stakeholder salience theory 
to explain the disclosure behaviour of connected firms, the power of 
political directors and high government stakes through ownership 
in firms as information providers that help managers to formulate 
strategic plans that are aligned with the policy, has improved the level 
of NONFINFL types. This suggests the capacity of political directors 
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to perform their duty to steer the firms towards the future through 
the provision of forward-looking information.
The implication of this research may pave the way for firms’ disclosure 
choices of forward-looking information under the perspective of 
political influence. As suggested under the abovementioned theory, 
the power, urgency and legitimacy brought by a political director 
to improve a firm’s forward-looking disclosure may be beneficial 
for regulators in establishing guidelines for the best practices of 
preparing such disclosure. This perspective can complement our 
understanding on the role of directors in monitoring governance, 
which is predominantly explained by the agency perspective. 
Practically, requirements and conditions for effective politicians in 
business are still subject to further research. At the very least, the 
evidence suggests that politicians’ involvement can increase market 
participants. Nevertheless, this study comes with several limitations. 
Firstly, the weight of the power of network centrality may not be 
suitable for the political environment in Malaysia. Our economic 
system is practised based on close- and near-relationship businesses. 
Therefore, rather than the central government, we believe the power 
of politicians to control resources is stronger in firms connected at the 
state-level. This factor can provide opportunities for future research 
to weigh the political strength based on close- and near-relationship 
businesses, such as that in the Malaysian setting. Secondly, our sample 
is limited to only non-financial listed firms. Thus, generalisability may 
be an issue. Moreover, our data only covers  a four-year period. The 
strength of political connections may not have yet developed during 
this period. 
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Endnotes
1 The list of keywords and topics/themes are presented in 
Appendix 1.
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2 For simplicity, we only show the equation for Model 1. This 
equation can be expanded into Models 2 to 9 by replacing the 
variables as explained.
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APPENDIX
Appendix 1
1. List of keywords by Abed et al. (2016)
Keywords Accelerate; Anticipate; Await; Coming (financial) year(s); Coming 
months; Confidence, Confident; Convince; Future; Possible; 
Estimate; Aim; Expect; Forecast; Forthcoming; Hope; Intend, 
Intention; Likely, Unlikely; Look ahead; Look forward; Next; 
Near term, medium term; Optimistic; Outlook; Plan; Predict; 
Remain; Renew; Probable; Opportunity; Commitment; Further; 
Chance; Well placed, Well positioned; Year(s) ahead; 2014/2017, 
2014-2017, 2014/17; 2014, 2015. . ..2017.






Strategy Mission, vision, strategy, policy, goal, 
proposal, target, programme, plan, 
objective
Structure Expansion, development, modification, 
improvement, product, invention, growth, 
progress, challenge, acquisition, merger, 
take over, market share
Environment Legal, regulation, law, environment, rule, 
politics, social, economical, industry, 
technology, competition, risk, uncertainty, 
market, trade, demand, inflation, interest 
rate, service, trend, employee, leadership, 





Financial Earning, revenue, sales, turnover, 
cash, debt, loan, leverage, cost, charge, 
backlog, return, outcome, income, profit, 
contribution, investment, assets, saving, 
benefit, dividend, expenditure, expense, 
payment, tax, liability, obligation,losses, 
margin, equity, liquidity, fund, 
depreciation, research and development, 
ROIC, ROCE, ROE, ROA, EPS, EBIT, FCF, 
COGS, NPV
